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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
VICKIE LYNN SHUPE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge 
of distribution of a controlled substance for value 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8 
(1) (a) (ii) (1953) as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial 
court decision finding the appellant guilty of dis-
tribution of a controlled substance in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court's conviction of the defendant-appellant. 
Case No. 
14136 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 16/ 1974, an undercover narcotics 
agent, Carolyn McPhee, was employed in the area of 
2nd South and 5th West. (Tr. 9,12) The agent was 
employed in this particular area for the purpose of 
purchasing some heroin. (Tr. 26) 
While the agent was walking in the area of 
2nd South and 5th West she observed the appellant/ 
Vickie Shupe standing in front of the Central Warehouse 
building. (Tr. 12) . The agent testified that she 
recognized the appellant and knew her from a few 
past acquaintances. (Tr. 12,21) They said hello 
to each other, and the appellant then asked the under-
cover agent, "Did you come to cop" (Tr. 13) This 
phrase was interpreted as meaning, did you come to 
purchase any kind of dope* (T. 13) The undercover 
agent replied "Yes". (Tr. 14) The appellant solicited 
a buyer for heroin of her own mind and free will, 
without any inducements from the undercover agent. 
The undercover agent did not ask the appellant of a 
place to buy heroin. (Tr. 26) 
The undercover agent and the appellant then 
walked to the Baywood Hotel and entered a room on the 
first floor. (Tr. 14) The appellant then introduced 
the agent to a woman in the room by the name of Pat. 
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(Tr. 15) The agent then gave the appellant money 
for the purchase of drugs, the appellant in turn 
gave it to Pat. Pat then gave the appellant a ballon 
baggie and the appellant in turn gave the baggie to 
the agent. (T. 15) 
The appellant then walked over to a dresser 
in the room, opened the drawer and took out heroin \ 
paraphenalia, including a spoon, a syringe, cotton 
and some matches,for the undercover agent to use. 
(T. 16) 
The undercover agent then requested to leave 
the hotel room. (Tr. 16,17). Shortly thereafter, 
appellant was arrested for the unlawful sale of a 
controlled substance. There was no evidence to show 
that the appellant was ever specifically employed as 
an agent for the undercover agent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT SHE WAS ACTING AS AN 
AGENT FOR THE UNDERCOVER AGENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE FACTS AND DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARD OF AGENCY 
UNDER UTAH LAW. 
In State v. Shultz, 28 Utah 2d 240f 501 P.2d 
106, (1972), this court described the defense of agency 
as follows: 
-3-
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"The defendant having been charged 
with the selling of a narcotic drug 
rather than being in possession of the 
same raises an issue under the facts 
of this case as to whether or not the 
defendant was an agent of the enforcement 
officer. The facts would support the 
proposition that defendant was induced 
by the enforcement officer to procure 
the controlled substance as the sole 
agent of the officer, and that the 
defendant had had no prior association 
with the seller nor was he acting in 
concert with the seller in the trans-
action. The record would also support 
the proposition that the defendant 
did not profit from the transaction." 
Ld. at 241. 
The critical considerations for the defense 
of agency are: 
1. The defendant must be induced by the 
enforcement officer to procure the controlled sub-
stance. 
*• 
2. The defendant has no prior association 
with the seller. 
3. The defendant is not acting in concert 
with the seller. 
4. The defendant did not profit from the 
transaction. 
The appellant in the instant case does not 
meet the above standard of agency. 
There is sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that the appellant in this case was not in-
duced to procure druges for the enforcement officer. 
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In fact, the appellant/ of her own mind and free will 
solicited the narcotics buy. (Tr. 13) The enforcement 
officer in the instant case did not ask the appellant 
for a place to buy drugs. (T. 26). This fact is 
in complete opposition to the requirements of the 
Shultz case. In ShultZ/ the defendant was induced 
by the law enforcement officer. 
The Shultz standard is also based upon the 
consideration that the defendant has no prior association 
with the seller that would indicate or give reasonable 
inferences that the defendant was acting in concert 
with the seller or might receive some form of profit 
from the transaction. 
In the instant case, an association between 
the defendant and the seller was shown. The 
appellant testified that she had purchased heroin 
from the seller before (T. 37) There was also 
testimony that the defendant reached in a closed 
dresser drawer, while in the hotel room of the seller, 
and obtained heroin paraphenelia. (T. 16) The 
defendant testified that she knew the paraphenelia 
was in the drawer because she had used it before# 
(T. 38) It is clear from the facts that the defendant 
had some type of association with the seller; and 
-^-
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from that, it can easily, and reasonably be in-
ferred by the trier of fact that there was some 
form of compensation available for the defendant. 
When all the facts in the instant case 
are examined and weighed, it is clear that 
appellant's claim of agency does not meet the 
Shultz standard. 
The trial court, sitting in the position of 
the trier of fact determined that the facts did 
not warrant a conclusion in favor of the defense 
of agency. The reviewing court must presume findings 
and judgment valid, and review the record most 
favorable thereto, and refrain from disturbing them 
when substantially supported and require appellant 
to show error. Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 
11 Utah 2d 389. (1961). 
To entitle an appellant to prevail, he must 
show both error and prejudice, that is,r that his 
substantial rights are affected and that there is 
at least a fair likelihood that the result would 
have been different. Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 
834, 120 Utah 631 (1951). 
In the instant case, appellant has failed to 
meet both the standard of agency under Utah law 
and has failed to rebut the strong presumption in 
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favor of the judgment of the trial court and there-
fore the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant 
has failed to meet the standard of agency under Utah 
law. To allow the facts of this case to receive the 
protection of the defense of agency would produce 
a rule so broad that it would create a very dangerous 
loophole for those guilty of distributing dangerous 
narcotics to escape. For this reason, the rule of 
agency in the Shultz case should be held to a very 
strict standard. Respondent respectfully submits 
that the lower court decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL P. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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